

Golden Tokens — Release 1

Church-Turing Meta-Machine

Kenneth J Hamer-Hodges

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Golden Tokens

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What Are Golden Tokens?


Golden Tokens (GTs) are the fundamental unit of access control in the Church Machine architecture. Every access to a resource – whether loading data, calling a service, or switching privilege levels – requires a valid Golden Token that grants the necessary permissions. Golden Tokens are unforgeable: they cannot be fabricated by software, only created and managed through hardware-enforced mechanisms.

A Golden Token encodes three things: 1. **What** resource it refers to (via `slot_id` — the namespace slot ID) 2. **What operations** are permitted (via permission bits) 3. **Whether it is authentic** (via integrity32 parallel check on the NS entry)

Without a valid Golden Token, no operation proceeds. Any attempt to use an invalid, expired, or insufficient token results in a FAULT.

GT Format

The Church Machine uses a 32-bit Golden Token with a precisely defined bit layout:



Bits	Field	Width	Description
[15:0]	slot_id	16	Namespace slot ID (0-65,535)
[22:16]	gt_seq	7	Revocation sequence counter; must match NS Entry Word 1 gt_seq
[24:23]	gt_type	2	GT class (NULL / Inform / Outform / Abstract)
[30:25]	perms	6	R, W, X, L, S, E (see below)
[31]	b_flag	1	Bind flag — 1 = GT may be propagated via mSave

Each capability register in Church Machine is 128 bits wide (4 x 32-bit words):

Word	Content
word0	The 32-bit Golden Token
word1	Lump base address (from NS Entry Word 0)
word2	NS Entry Word 1: spare[31:29] \ g_bit[28] \ gt_seq[27:21] \ limit_offset[20:0]
word3	NS Entry Word 2: integrity32 check (32-bit parallel check)

GT Permission Bits (Church Machine)

The GT stores exactly 6 permission bits in bits [30:25]. These are the mutually exclusive access rights – three for data operations (Turing domain) and three for capability operations (Church domain):

Bit (in perms field)	Absolute bit	Name	Domain	Description
0	25	R	Turing	Read data from the referenced resource
1	26	W	Turing	Write data to the referenced resource
2	27	X	Turing	Execute code at the referenced location
3	28	L	Church	Load a Golden Token from a C-List via mLoad
4	29	S	Church	Save a Golden Token to a C-List via mSave
5	30	E	Church	Enter an abstraction (call a service)

Domain Purity

A GT may carry Turing permissions (R, W, X) **or** Church permissions (L, S, E), but **never both**. This is enforced in hardware at TPERM time — any attempt to create a mixed-domain GT raises a DOMAIN_PURITY fault.

E Isolation

Within the Church domain, E (Enter — invoke an abstraction) must be **standalone**. E may not be combined with L (Load from c-list) or S (Save to c-list). A token that combines E with L or S would allow its holder to both traverse the nodal c-list and enter the abstraction it contains — an attack path that bypasses the separation between the capability list and the code it holds. E is the entry key to a function; L and S are the keys to the capability list that owns it. They must never be the same key.

Valid: R, W, X, RW, RX, RWX	(Turing pure)
Valid: L, S, E, LS	(Church pure – E standalone)
Invalid: RL, WL, XE, RE, WS, RWXE, RWXL	(cross-domain – any mix of {R,W,X} with {L,S,E})
Invalid: LE, SE, LSE	(E isolation – E combined with L or S exposes abstraction internals)

B Flag — Bind

B (bit 31 of GT Word 0) controls whether the GT may be propagated to another c-list via mSave:

- **B=0** (default): the GT cannot be copied out of its current c-list — mSave FAULTs.

- **B=1**: the GT is bindable — mSave permits the write.

B is set by the IDE at lump creation time and may be cleared by CALL on preserved CRs passed to the callee (“no bind by default”).

M Permission – Transient Microcode Elevation

M is **not stored in the GT**. It exists only as a transient signal (`sub_m_elevated`) that microcode asserts during mLoad execution. When mLoad completes, M is gone. No user instruction can set, test, or observe M. This prevents privilege escalation.

GT Type Field (`gt_type`, bits [24:23])

The Church Machine includes a 2-bit type field classifying the nature of the referenced resource:

Value	Type	Description
00	NULL	Empty / invalid — always faults on use
01	Inform	GT points to a lump or data object in local memory via an NS entry
10	Outform	GT references an IDE-managed dependency (lazy-loaded via Locator)
11	Abstract	GT IS the value — constants, immutable credentials, PassKey tokens

NULL is architecturally distinct from all valid reference types. Any GT with `gt_type=00` immediately faults at ChurchNSGate before any NS lookup is performed.

gt_seq Field (bits [22:16])

Church Machine includes a 7-bit `gt_seq` field in bits [22:16] of the Golden Token. This revocation counter is critical for namespace integrity and garbage collection safety:

- Each namespace entry stores a corresponding `gt_seq` value in NS Entry Word 1 bits [27:21].
- When a GT is used (LOAD or CALL), ChurchNSGate compares `gt_word0.gt_seq` against the NS entry’s `gt_seq`. A mismatch means the GT has been revoked — access FAULTs immediately.

- During garbage collection, reclaimed entries have their `gt_seq` incremented. All outstanding GTs referencing that entry become stale instantly.
- 7 bits gives 128 revocation generations before wraparound.


Namespace Entry Format

Each namespace entry occupies **3 consecutive 32-bit words** (12 bytes). The slot byte address is `slot_id × 12` (or equivalently `slot_id × 3` words) from the NS table base. The NS table supports up to **65,536 entries** (bounded by the 16-bit `slot_id` field).

Word 0 — Base Address

The 32-bit lump base byte address.

Word 1 — Limit + `gt_seq` (WORD2_LAYOUT)



Bits	Field	Description
[20:0]	limit_offset	Object size in words minus 1 (21-bit)
[27:21]	gt_seq	Revocation counter; compared against GT <code>gt_seq</code> by ChurchNSGate
[28]	g_bit	GC mark bit — may be set by GC; masked before integrity32 check
[31:29]	spare	Reserved

Word 2 — integrity32 Check

The 32-bit integrity32 parallel check result, computed over NS Entry Word 0 and Word 1 (with `g_bit` masked to zero before the check).

integrity32 Integrity

ChurchNSGate recomputes integrity32 over NS Entry Word 0 and Word 1 (`g_bit` cleared) and compares against NS Entry Word 2. A mismatch faults with `SEAL` error, preventing use of any tampered NS entry.

Capability Registers

The Church Machine provides 16 capability registers (CR0–CR15), divided into two groups:

Instruction-Addressable Registers (CR0–CR11)

These registers are directly accessible by Church instructions through a 4-bit register encoding field. Software can freely read and manipulate GTs in these registers using `LOAD`, `SAVE`, and other Church instructions.

Privileged Registers (CR12–CR15)

These registers are protected from direct instruction access. The only way to write to a privileged register is through the `SWITCH` instruction, which requires appropriate permissions. This architectural constraint prevents privilege escalation through direct register manipulation.

Special Register Roles

Register	Name	Role
CR6	C-List	Current capability list — the set of capabilities available to running code
CR12	Thread Stack	Thread stack capability (privileged, system-wide; loaded at boot B:02)
CR13	Interrupt	System-wide interrupt handler capability (privileged, unchanged by CHANGE)
CR14	Code/ CLOOMC	Current code GT — instruction fetch source (privileged, per-thread; re-derived by CALL)
CR15	Namespace	Namespace root — defines the security boundary of the entire system

CR6 and CR14 are re-derived by CALL/RETURN via mLoad. CR12 is saved and restored by CHANGE (thread switching). CR13 and CR15 are system-wide and unchanged by CHANGE. The privileged zone (CR12-CR15) cannot be addressed by normal programmer instructions.

Cross-references

- `architecture.md` — Overall Church Machine architecture
 - `Lump-Architecture.md` — Accessible overview of the Lump object model
 - `CM_LUMP_SPECIFICATION.md` — Authoritative binary encoding and field specification
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